NASA Levy, Charles - May 30, 2000

Interview with Charles Levy

 

Interviewer: Tara Seibel

Interview Date: May 30, 2000

Location: Levy home, Georgetown, Texas

 

 

SEIBEL:  Today is May 30, 2000.  This oral history with Mr. Charles Levy is being conducted at 103 Barndance Cove, the home of the interviewee in Georgetown, Texas.  The interview is being conducted for the NASA/Johnson Space Center Oral History Project in conjunction with Southwest Texas State University, History Department by graduate student Tara Seibel.  Mr. Levy, are you aware that the interview is being conducted for the NASA/Southwest Texas State Oral History Project and will be available for research purposes?

 

LEVY:  Yes.

 

SEIBEL:  To begin with, I should ask what year you entered working for NASA?

 

LEVY:  I started at Goddard Space Flight Center [Maryland] in July of 1962.  Basically stayed there for several years and where I moved to the Manned Spacecraft Center in July of ’64, which of course, is now the Johnson Space Center. 

 

SEIBEL:  What was your background training to prepare you for NASA?

 

LEVY:  Actually I was doing work for the Federal Aviation Agency prior to that working on Nav-aid systems.  I met a guy from NASA while I was down in Florida, and he had, from Goddard, asked if I was interested in going to work for NASA.  I thought that was quite a challenge, yes, and took him up on it. 

 

SEIBEL:  You said you started working in 1962.  Were you start working on Mercury as soon as you came in?

 

LEVY:  No, actually when I came in I worked on the Gemini program, initially.  I started out actually headed up the advanced development group for digital techniques in the Flight Data Systems branch.  When some problems came up on Gemini I was asked to take on those activities and look into them.   So I did, and ended up being much more involved in Gemini.  Basically took over the division which was back then Instrumentation and Electronics Division.  Headed up the division activities for Gemini communications instrumentation, and we did a lot of, I personally took care of the PCM system and got involved in the command system for the Agena vehicle when it was having a lot of troubles.

 

SEIBEL:  Could you elaborate a little bit more on the PCM system and what your work was on that?

 

LEVY:  Okay, the Pulse Code Modulation and Telemetry system was a decentralized system based on an analog data bus.  They needed somebody to work it with, of course, at McDonnell Douglas was building the Gemini vehicle.  So I worked with them with the design tests and qualification and went through much of spacecraft reviews where we justified that it was in good shape to fly.  Of course, then Chuck Matthews headed up the Gemini program. 

 

Subsequent to that, we ran into some problems with the Command Programmer on the Gemini-Agena target vehicle.  And I got called in on that to do an investigation that was being built, of course, by Lockheed back then.  So I went to Lockheed and reviewed.  [I] found some problems they had, wrote and evaluation on it, and suggested that if they didn’t fix them they’d run into problems, and they really did.  They had a problem with the command programmer not releasing the shroud on it, so it couldn’t dock.  Anyway, it was an interesting project.

 

SEIBEL:  After Gemini, did you work on Apollo?

 

LEVY:  Yes, as a matter of fact I did.  I ended up heading up the Digital Techniques section after that was over with.  We ended up responsible for the Command Source Module and both Pulse Code Modulation Telemetry system, the LM Signal Processor Assembly, which was basically the premodulation system for the Lunar Module, and the Command Service Module Premodualtion Processor, as well as the Dual Feed Coupler.  Most of it was the basic telemetry and premodulation, getting it prepared for putting it onto the transmitter modulation. 

 

SEIBEL:  After Apollo, did you work on any of the other programs?

 

LEVY:  Yeah, actually in between that I headed up the Space Station study, if you would like to believe that back in about ’67.  I got pulled out in between to basically head up an Advanced Projects Office within the division.  So I headed up what was called the Space Station Office and we conducted feasibility studies and preliminary designs for communication, data, instrumentation, and electrical subsystems for the, basic to all advanced programs, but primarily Dr. Magetti had an activity going on to design a space station back then.  That’s when we did it. 

 

Also, developed a division on Research and Technology programs during that period of time.  In between, we did the Lunar Survey system.  We were involved in that design activity.  We had an interesting program with the Earth Resources program back then too.  Evidently, the State Department had committed the aircraft program from the Earth Resources program to fly some flights over parts of Mexico they had done with Mexico.  They didn’t have the airplane completed at the time.  They tried to get some telemetry systems and never could get one delivered.  So they came to me and we ended up designing and building and integrating a Pulse Code Modulation Telemetry system into the Earth Resources aircraft in, within about three months – so they could fly it on time, which was really very nice. 

In Skylab, I worked on the Data Systems and Unlink Systems for both the Command and Service Module and the Skylab and the Unlink Systems.  In Advanced Programs, I had an interesting thing back when I was still heading up the Digital Techniques Group.  We had an Advanced Programs group, matter of fact I started what was called a Stored Program Data Processor Development, and we continued on and developed that along with the Data Bus Systems and we were building LSI Computers back in the ‘60s.  We actually ended up bread-boarding the Shuttle telemetry data, I should say the Data Management System from our developments.  We also developed the first Pulse Code Integrated Circuit, fully integrated circuit Pulse Code Modulation System, which was done at a very, very inexpensive price for NASA, primarily because the Air Force, unbeknown to me.  At the time the Air Force decided whoever got my contract, they would go to them.  So we ended up getting a lot of buy-ins for it.  I think we got three flight units that we developed to the Command Service Module specifications and one test unit, production unit, for what we used to call an all-occasion test for $33,000, which was unbelievable.  That was an interesting project. 

 

During those days too, I also served as the chairman of the Data Managing Systems Panel for the Shuttle Phase B Activities Study.  

 

SEIBEL:  Did you do any work on Apollo-Soyuz?

 

LEVY:  Apollo-Soyuz, we did do work on it, but we had already done all of the design and testing and integration work basically during the Apollo program.  So all we did on Apollo-Soyuz was basically make sure that the systems we were responsible for on the Command and Service Module were still fully operational and in good shape.

 

SEIBEL:  Could you elaborate a little more on your work with the Shuttle?

 

LEVY:  On the Shuttle, yeah.  The Stored Program Data Processor, by the way, was the first fully programmable format telemetry system that was built.  The systems that were on the Shuttle, which were the telemetry systems, we did the SPDP, we had the to provide interface for the computer because we had thought ahead that would be absolutely necessary in the future spacecraft.  And that system was carried on into the Shuttle and so the relationship with the computer systems and the telemetry systems was carried forth.  So, basically engineered that before the Shuttle was even conceived.  The Data Bus System, we had developed long before the Shuttle.  That concept was carried on.  There were design changes to it that were made because we did them in a research manner.  [The Remote Acquisitions Control System], we had gotten as far as the SPDP as well. 

 

So, all of that technology was carried forth into the Shuttle era and like I said we bread-boarded using that equipment and Shuttle system which was used for evaluation when the original system was built.  In context of that, we had responsibility for that.  The payload went through what was called the Payload Data Interlink. I had a lot of input on that design with Rockwell, as well as the Telemetry System and Data Bus System.  All of the people that worked those units in conjunction with the Rockwell engineers worked for me at the time, but I did have a lot of input because a lot of the original work that I did was on followed forth in that. 

 

After that I took over when the designs began to get mature, I was asked to take over as a manager of Orbiter Avionics Systems Interfaces for the division which was the Intercontrol Systems Development Division after some reorganizations.  I was responsible to organize all the activities and write all of the Johnson Space Center Representative for the relationship between the Orbiter Avionics accommodations and the external tank and the Solid Rocket Booster as well as Payloads and Experiments.  That was in about ’74.  In ’78, the External Tank and the Solid Rocket Booster were beginning to get real mature and very little thought was given to payloads and experiments at that time, so I was asked to take over as manager of Avionics Cargo Integration for the Avionics System Division, and as such, I had a lot to do with the accommodations that the Shuttle made for payloads and for experiments and the actual design of the interfaces and the accommodations that the electronics made for the payloads and experiments. 

 

I was asked to chair the first STS integration software review.  And that was interesting because the system had not been set up, so I ended up having to organize a system and then meet with Larry Williams who was in the Program Engineering Office Chief and Dr. Lenny who was I think then the manager of the whole operation.  That was a lot of fun.  It was interesting.  It went actually real smoothly, very smoothly. 

 

I was involved with the Europeans quite a bit on the Spacelab.  I co-chaired with Vern Boulton who was the co-chair on the European side.  And we ended up writing up, with a whole cast of thousands involved, I should say hundreds.  We had quite a few people that wanted to get involved in that.  We co-chaired the writing of the ICD and how everything would play operationally with each other, which was a huge document.  It was probably three or four inches thick and we did that in one week.  We had about a week.  We started on Monday, and that following Tuesday, Tuesday of the following week it was supposed to go to the Secretary General of ESA, the European Space Agency, and Dr. [Henry] Kissinger who was then the Secretary of State.  They were supposed to sign the document.  So, we didn’t have a lot of time to mess around anyway.  So it moved along and we got that written and it turned out there was not a lot of changes made to it that I hear. 

 

[I] was asked to participate on their design reviews, which was interesting, and that allowed me as well as being responsible for the Orbiter side or the Shuttle side of the interface, to make sure theirs was compatible with us, their designs.  In order to make sure the performance was right, we had agreed to do testing in their preproduction hardware within our laboratories in Johnson.  So they brought all of their equipment in and we did the testing it.  Actually made some design changes before they went into production, which saved a lot hassle.  I should say unpleasant times.  So that worked very nicely and it was a good cooperation between us and the Europeans, which turned out to be very, very profitable, I think, over the long haul. 

 

As well as working with the Europeans, I ended up serving as chairman of the STS/DOD Avionics Working Group, which integrated all of the Department of Defense programs into the NSTS.  I also served as the consultant to both the NASA safety panel and the DOD safety review team for avionics, electrical hazards, and controls.  Prior to that I developed some of the STS guidelines on the subject of electrical safety, which I think are still in effect.  Served as assistant consultant while I was at NASA while the DOD was developing some of their payload support systems. 

 

SEIBEL:  A pretty full career right there.

 

LEVY:  Yeah, it was a lot of fun.  I really enjoyed that.  I enjoyed working for NASA.  NASA, when I went to work for them was very, very unique in that you could work together as teams without an awful lot of hassle between management, the structure, or anything else.  It was very, very team oriented and I was very, very good.  It was a fun environment to work in and people could do things without a lot of red tape, so to speak.  That was an environment for accomplishing an awful lot. 

 

SEIBEL:  You stated that you came in on Gemini.  I know that the three programs were working simultaneously.  Was there a lot of interaction between them?

 

LEVY:  Actually, Mercury was pretty much over when I came in.  Gemini was having some difficulties, which was the reason I got involved in it.  Of course, Apollo was going on too.  When Gemini ran into some problems, it became highly apparent and obvious that if we didn’t solve the problems on Gemini, we weren’t going to solve them on Apollo.  So, we spent a lot of time working with the Gemini program office to resolve their issues.  And that became the highest priority over in the Advanced Development.  It was an operational issue that had to be resolved before we could move on and we just bared down and went off and did it.

 

SEIBEL:  Moving back to before you entered NASA, when Sputnik was launched in ’57, what were your thoughts on that?

 

LEVY:  Amazed.  Basically, I was disappointed that it wasn’t the Americans that had done it, obviously.  I was intrigued by the accomplishment, which I thought was fantastic and opened up a complete new realm of research.  It made it, probably emphasized my going into electronics more than anything.  It had apparent to me because I said the future is just fantastic when that happened.  I knew that the United States just wouldn’t let that go forth, and I figured I would like to be a part of it.  So when I had the opportunity, I jumped.  I didn’t have to think twice.

 

SEIBEL:  What were your thoughts then on the launch of Explorer 1?

 

LEVY:  I don’t know.  Back when I was with Goddard, I had done a lot of the compatibility testing on those, going back to S-6 and S-66.  I worked with Dr. [James] Van Allen on their engine three series.  It really didn’t have, I kind of felt I knew what was going on ‘cause I had been in, you know.  The scientific satellite areas was a good area to be in.  I thought it was great.  I thought what they achieved was good.  Explorer 1, I don’t know that I really had any specific thoughts about it.

 

SEIBEL:  It was more Sputnik then?

 

LEVY:  Yeah, Sputnik I think had the biggest impact.  Although when I started with NASA on the scientific programs, unmanned vehicles; I think that the biggest impact was Sputnik, of course it was unmanned.  The manned program, I guess, had the biggest impact on me because of the challenge of engineering with a man being involved.  I mean you could lose a scientific satellite.  We didn’t take all the backup systems and all of the engineering.  We didn’t do all that on scientific programs.  We had backup systems and everything, so that we would keep the astronaut alive, and bring him back safely, was to me the real challenge.  It was a different impact with the scientific and manned programs, to me anyway.

 

SEIBEL:  Did Yuri Gagarin going into space and then later Alan Shepard have as much of an impact on you as Sputnik or do you think more?

 

LEVY:  No.  I happened to have been at the Cape [Canaveral] with the first [and] I was putting in a navigational aid system in Orlando at the time, when Mercury went up.  As a matter of fact that when I got conned, not conned, invited to go into NASA.  I was amazed at watching the liftoff and looking at it.  I thought it looked great.  It looked like a lot of fun.  I don’t know that either of them had more of an impact on me than the other. 

 

The biggest impact on the manned program was my getting involved in it and understanding the differences, engineering-wise, that you had to overcome as opposed to doing something in an unmanned version or ground systems.  In an airplane situation I was involved in airplanes, it certainly wasn’t the same thing as a spacecraft.  If you lose a Nav-aid system in an aircraft, there are a lot of alternatives.  You don’t have a lot of alternatives in a spacecraft.  So if you lose electronics systems or some key systems that are there to aid the astronaut to get back safely, that’s a real key interest.

 

SEIBEL:  Were there any specific aspects working on the manned program versus the unmanned that you consider to be a particular challenge?

 

LEVY:  Yeah, it’s providing all the backup systems and the controls necessary in the design those in, so that they’re onboard when he needs them.

 

SEIBEL:  Were there any problems that came up with that?

 

LEVY:  There are always problems, especially in the Shuttle program in deciding how to run the five computers simultaneously.  How to separate the redundancy for the Data Bus systems and the remote units.  All of that was a challenge, yes.  It’s much different than designing one system and then allowing you to switch over to another one anytime because they had to always be active and ready to be online when needed.  Yeah, that’s the biggest engineering challenge, I think.  It was the most interesting.

 

SEIBEL:  After Alan Shepard’s launch into space when [President John F.] Kennedy gave his challenge to the country to have a man on the Moon by the end of the decade, what were your thoughts on that?

 

LEVY:  He’s nuts. [laughter] Well, I’m being a little bit facetious, but it was a challenge.  The only way it could have been accomplished was to have been backed financially, to meet the objective, and it was.  A lot of things were accomplished in a quick amount of time.  I mean a lot of things that paralleled that, probably, you wouldn’t have done in normal circumstances.  We would a lot of times go into production without completely, fully testing out the preproduction models.  We tested as far as we could, but you had to make a decision to forge ahead, take the risk, which we had to do.  Normally, you would like to complete all the testing and the bread-boards and brass-boards and preproduction models before you moved on to the next one.  In a lot of cases, you didn’t have that option and an opportunity to do that.  It was a risk – a risk that paid off in meeting that schedule.

 

SEIBEL:  What were your personal thoughts on the space race that later ensued?

 

LEVY:  My thoughts, basically, it had to get done.  Other than thinking any further than that, I didn’t.  We just went out and did it.  It paid a toll on families.  I was away from my family more than I would have like to have been.  I didn’t get a chance to see my kids grow up, in a lot of cases.  My wife did a super job.  But it was a just a lot of fun.  We did a lot of our own personal time there, working to solve problems and do things.  Other than that, it was just that it needed to get done. 

 

SEIBEL:  What were your thoughts on when Apollo 11 when it finally got to the Moon?

 

LEVY:  Elation.  Hey, we did it.  It’s a hard thing to describe.  It was a sense of pride.  It’s [an] accomplishment.  A very, very choice occasion. 

 

SEIBEL:  When the Apollo program finally ended, were you disappointed in it or were you ready to move on to what was next?

 

LEVY:  Unfortunately to say, I’m an engineer.  By the time the Apollo program was over, we were off working on the Shuttle.  We doing the things that had to be done to keep the equipment we were responsible for operating and tested properly.  [If] we had problems, they’d call us in.  Of course, that was the first priority because they were an operational program.  But the majority of our activity in engineering and development side, was looking forward to the next night.  What were we going to do next?  How were we going to design it?  What are our issues?  So we were paying more attention to those, bread-boarding techniques and systems that we thought we needed to enhance past the Apollo program.  So we were looking past that.

 

SEIBEL:  Recently, within movies and television, Apollo 13 has become speculated upon and looked at more in detail by the public.  What was going on in your own personal thoughts on what happened with that?

 

LEVY:  When it happened, of course, the first thing that came to mind was, “Hey, what do we got to do to get the job done?” Other than that I didn’t have any other thoughts.  At the time, of course, it’s an emergency.  Fortunately, several of the people that worked for me at that time, we were also responsible for the electrical systems which is what had to be fixed.  The guys had thought about, in doing potential problem analysis you try to make up all things that could go wrong and how you would fix them.  So this had been considered throughout our process of thinking, oh several two three years ago before that happened, and they had already sketched that out, how it could be fixed, and that was immediately turned in to the operations people, and then it was matured and so forth.  It obviously worked out well.  The end result due to the tragedy was of course, the best you could expect.  After that, of course, I wasn’t responsible for the cryos, all that kind of stuff, it was up to those people to figure that out.  Other than, “Let’s get them back,” I had no other thoughts.

 

SEIBEL:  With ’72 being the last time that we had sent a man to the Moon, is there a disappointment in that or do you think we should have had more programs on the Moon?

 

LEVY:  It’s hard for me to say.  I don’t know what the results were from the standpoint politically and from the lunar scientists.  I don’t know whether they got everything they needed.  I was a little bit disappointed.  But I was so busy off working other programs that I figured the people who made those decisions knew what they were doing.  I was ready to move on.  From an engineering perspective, when things get flying and get in an operational mode, the engineers start.

 

SEIBEL: Move on to what’s next?

 

LEVY:  Yeah, so we were off doing what was next going on.  So I didn’t have any negative thoughts.  I didn’t have any positive thoughts.  I just, hey maybe they got what they needed and we need to move on. 

 

SEIBEL:  What do you see for the future of NASA in space flight?

 

LEVY:  I really have not given a lot of thought.  I think if the country is really serious about keeping man in space, they need to come out and formulate a twenty, thirty-year plan.  If they’re interested in going to Mars, they ought to plot how they’re going to get there.  One of the biggest problems I see with NASA is that they figure out a program and they go do that program, but they haven’t figured out where they’re going to go past that program.  They need to step back and decide where they’re going to be thirty, forty years from now and then plot a method of how to get there.  And their program should be based on that, and not on individual programs.  I think if they did that they could find an evolutionary way to get there a lot less expensive than they’re doing now.  They need to get cross-correlation between manned and unmanned programs between all their programs.  Instead of developing their program totally from scratch and going to that, they ought to take a look at what systems are available to do multiple programs. 

 

I think the public would be a lot more accepting of NASA spending money than they are today.  They’ve had a lot of failures.  I’m not saying that’s bad, good, but there’s evidently a lack of oversight in what they’re doing.  I don’t know if it’s that they’re losing their experienced people or what.  They’re going through the learning process again, but somehow or another that all needs to be focused back on to good engineering practices and consolidating a good long range program that accomplishes everything they’re doing. 

 

SEIBEL:  Do you think it would take something like another Cold War, perhaps, to lend that kind of urgency as it did with Apollo?

 

LEVY:  Yeah, but I can’t imagine anything that would come about today that would need to go into an urgency like we did in Apollo. That was a new frontier.  Basically the frontier that happened on the Apollo was not a civil issue.  It was really an issue of defense, diagram, so to speak.  Even though we were in a civil agency, it had more military implications than anything.  I think that was the issue of urgency.  I can’t think of anything today that would drive that urgency again.  I think as long as the military gets it appropriate budgets that are flying the space people and the military, as well the national reconnaissance office, as long as they get their funds, I can’t imagine that happening again anymore – that we would get beat in that area.  I think we got caught with our pants down.  I don’t think it will happen again. 

 

SEIBEL:  Going back to the Cold War era, do you think that perhaps maybe during the work on Apollo-Soyuz, the tensions eased up a bit and there wasn’t as much of a military push?

 

LEVY:  No, I don’t think so.  I think that was a risk that the United States took in coming out with Apollo-Soyuz.  I believe it was more a political than it was easing tensions or anything.  I think they got more out of it that we did.  From a technology point of view, we learned almost nothing.  Whereas, I think we aided them considerably during the Apollo-Soyuz program in advancing their technologies, so to speak.

 

SEIBEL:  Looking back at that now, do you see that as a positive or a negative?

 

LEVY:  Politically, it was probably very much a positive.  Technologically, it was a negative. 

 

SEIBEL:  It didn’t help us at all?

 

LEVY:  I don’t think it did an awful lot to help us.  I think it, from a political point of view, yes.  From an engineering or technology point of view, I don’t think so.

 

SEIBEL:  Did you have any interaction from the Russian space program?

 

LEVY:  No.  I personally did not.  My people did.  I did not.

 

SEIBEL:  Were you still working at NASA during Challenger?

 

LEVY:  No, I had retired from NASA and gone to work for Lockheed Martin.  I was head [of] engineering at Lockheed in Houston, right across from the street from the them.  I was at the time integrating the Department of Defense satellites into the Shuttle STS system.  And it was quite a shock because I had worked with [Ellison] Onizuka quite a bit.  He was a friend.  It was a very sad day.  Very sad day. 

 

SEIBEL:  Do you think that NASA recovered quickly enough from the Challenger disaster?

 

LEVY:  I don’t think they could have recovered any quicker.  I think they had to go through the process of evaluating what happened, making sure they had the right fixes, making sure the system was fixed, the main system I’m talking about is the management system, as well.  I don’t think that one way or another I have an opinion about it.  I think that they did a good, logical methodology for it and that’s what was needed. 

 

SEIBEL:  I guess moving a little bit further, have you been keeping track of what’s happening with the International Space Station?  Do you have any opinions on that?

 

LEVY:  Very little.  I don’t have a lot of opinions.  Again, I think that us began a joint program of that magnitude with some past adversaries and potential adversaries is not wise.  Again, I think that even though a space station has a lot of scientific capability and a lot of scientific applications, a space station also has a lot of military implications and applications.  We, as a country, spending a lot of money for something that is not necessarily going to help us on a military side, which could help so many other countries.  I kind of have a negative opinion about it.  Although I was involved in joint programs with other countries, I think when you get into something like that that has potentially a lot of military applications that we should be very cautious in what we do.

 

SEIBEL:  Do you think that we should be concentrating more with the space program militarily?

 

LEVY:  I think NASA provides or will be a benefit to the country in so much as its developments can be processed and disseminated amongst people of the United States and they take advantage of it like a lot of the insulation foe improvements and refrigerators.  The advances that we made in sensors for the medical profession.  All of that is extremely worthwhile.  We don’t do enough.  I don’t think they do enough to toot their own horn.  Of course, they don’t get budgeted to do that.  One of the main reasons of the government is to protect the security of this country and to me that’s one of the major items that has to be accomplished.  That needs to be looked at first and everything else needs to take a backseat to it.  Just my own opinion.

 

SEIBEL:  Since you consider military to be more important for NASA?

 

LEVY:  No, I think from our country’s point of view.  If you’re looking at it from our federal government, one of the reasons we established the United States is to be strong from a security point of view and, obviously, that’s one of the main functions of this country.  I think it ought to be looked at in those kinds of priorities. 

 

SEIBEL:  I guess out of my own curiosity, what do you think about the SETI program then?  The Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence.  Do you see it as being worthwhile?

 

LEVY:  I don’t know enough about it.  I really don’t.  I haven’t really paid much attention to it.  Before I retired I obviously was involved more with the Department of Defense, when I retired.  I see what they’re doing, I know what they’re doing, and I think it’s magnificent.  I think they need to continue it.

 

SEIBEL:  Looking back on your career, what do you think was probably the most challenging aspect of working at NASA?

 

LEVY:  I still go back to the engineering and the feats that were accomplished in order to get to being up there to the Moon and back safely.  All of the back-up systems that were designed into it, I think was a feat.  I really do.  I believe it was the same way, and even more so, in the Shuttle because we used a lot more advanced technologies and concepts that we probably did a lot to bring it into the development and research area of it.  I think that was probably my most interesting part of NASA.

 

SEIBEL:  Have you seen the new Shuttle design?

 

LEVY:  No, I really haven’t.  I’ve been so busy retiring and moving and finding a place to retire to that I really haven’t paid lot of attention to it. 

 

SEIBEL:  Do you have any thoughts on NASA’s changing the Shuttle?

 

LEVY:  No, I really don’t.  I’m sure it’s got to be for the better.  The Shuttle has been going on for a good while.  So the designs are probably 1970, original designs, early ‘70s, late ‘60s.  So I’m sure we’ve run into a lot of part obsolescence problems that has to be brought up into what’s being produced today.  New technology coming along, it’s got to be an improvement.  Yeah, they got to keep the Shuttle flying into the first quarter of the century and beyond, they have to do that.  They don’t have any choice.  That’s part of the maintenance and upgrading of a vehicle, whether it an airplane or a space vehicle.  All that has to happen. 

 

SEIBEL:  Looking back on all of your work at NASA, you mentioned earlier the negative affects it had on your personal life, do you miss it?

 

LEVY:  Do I miss NASA?  Do I miss my career?  I thought I would.  I thought it was going to be an adjustment, but it really hasn’t.  I enjoy not having to get up and spend a lot of time at work.  I enjoy being able to do what I want to do when I want to do it.  No time schedules.  So, no I, to some point when I look at it, yeah, I’d to get in the action.  But on the other hand, I’ve done my time.  I’ve paid my dues.  There are younger people out there, probably a lot brighter than I am in technology.  So no it’s time for the other troops to step up to the line.

 

SEIBEL:  Do you think that the younger troops that you mentioned are living up to the legacy that you set in the Apollo program?

 

LEVY:  I don’t think you can compare when I went in to today.  When we went in it was all new stuff, in so much as flying spacecraft, in so much as putting a man up there.  So it’s not the same thing.  We had a lot more leeway, back when I was in it, and it was a lot more fun back then too.  You could contribute and do a lot more.  Today there is much more management control.  We didn’t have that.  I mean we had more or less team control where we all worked together to get a per common function.  I’m not so sure that’s the case anymore.  I think they’re being inhibited doing that.  I guess that’s one of the reasons I’m glad I retired.  That’s true everywhere, by the way, it’s not only in NASA.  It’s true everywhere.  Watch things get mature, bureaucracy takes over, and, so, no it’s not as much fun today as it was back then.  I don’t know about commenting on people living up to a legacy.  I just don’t know that they have the same options or prerogative or openness that we did.  So I prefer not to comment.  I don’t know what they’re being inhibited by.

 

SEIBEL:  Do you have any closing thoughts?

 

LEVY:  No, I’m glad I was a part of it.  It was one hell of a ride.  It was worth it.

 

SEIBEL:  Thank you very much.  We really appreciate you doing this for us.